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GEOLOCATION 
By Matthew Evans 
Supervisor: Dr Andrew Hutchison 
  
The rapid adoption of the internet has occurred despite the lack of a 
ubiquitous identity meta-system. The status quo is a patchwork of proprietary 
security systems. A number of security issues have arisen as a result which 
threaten to lead to a loss of trust in the internet, and may limit the scope of 
applications built on it; effectively constraining the potential of the internet as 
a platform for business and services. Current initiatives by a broad consortium 
of industry leaders promise a vastly improved landscape with a set of 
interoperable protocols and systems, built on open specifications, and guided 
by a set of core identity principles, enabling a more secure online experience.  
Simultaneously there have arisen a large number of location aware web 
application and services which detect and use a user’s location to enhance 
their application experience. These advances, although useful, present new 
security and privacy issues. 
 This paper investigates the operation of one of the new identity technologies, 
information cards, and proposes extensions to the existing supported schemas 
to incorporate recent advances in geo-location technology. The proposal is 
supported by reference to existing open source implementations.
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The evolution of distributed computing networks such as the internet has created a problem 
with identity:  the HTTP protocol, upon which much internet based data communication 
takes place, was designed to be stateless1. Between client requests a server process retains no 
specific client state information. This is reconstructed on each request, using data passed with 
the request, typically in the form of a cookie header, or stored in memory on the server and 
accessed via session identifiers passed in the URL or a hidden form field. 
This is not of itself problematic; in fact the simplicity, and resource efficiency of the model 
has contributed in no small measure to the success of the protocol. However the artificial 
nature of the way in which state (and identity) is maintained through a session impacts the 
ability of the protocol to incorporate a common tokenized identity ‘layer’ (in the same way 
that local network protocols, such as Active Directory, or Novell’s NetWare support it). 
As a result of this, there has evolved a patchwork of proprietary, custom authentication, 
authorization and single sign-on solutions, largely based around the paradigm of user name 
and password, and employing HTTP cookies, our URL based session identifiers. These 
solutions are often insecure2 and usually mutually incompatible.  
The problems with this status quo are numerous and well documented, and include phishing, 
password fatigue and poor data management policies. Data is routinely compromised, identity 
theft is increasingly common and there is a very real threat to the internet as a platform for 
services and commerce. 
The problem was identified some time ago, and a number of proposed solutions have been 
implemented and attempted. Among them is Microsoft’s Passport (originally part of the 
‘Hailstorm’3 set of services) which was positioned as a platform agnostic XML based API for 
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user authentication and profiling, freely available to any web sites who wished to use it. 
Although this solution in many respects was very successful (there are millions of daily 
authentications processed by it), it never became the common standard for web 
authentication outside the Microsoft stable of web sites and services, and some high-profile 
early adopters such as http://www.ebay.com dropped support for it relatively quickly4. The 
generally cited reason for this failure is consumer unwillingness to entrust their personal data 
to a third party without justification for holding it.  
As a result of lessons learned from these deployments it became clear that a new initiative was 
required to establish the identity layer, and numerous collaborations were begun to achieve 
that goal. Among them were: 
 OpenID5, a method of establishing identity based on proving ‘ownership’ of a unique 
resource identifier, such as an internet address The unique qualities of these resources 
(such as URL’s, or extensible resource identifiers) allows it to function as an 
identifier., providing that a user can establish ‘ownership’. The resource then 
represents the user online. This is conceptually similar to the PayPal system which 
uses an email address as a globally unique identifier, and indeed PayPal is a corporate 
member of the OpenId Foundation, along with Google, IBM, Microsoft and Yahoo. 
The OpenId technology is examined in greater detail in chapter 2.1.3.1.  
 The Oasis Security Services Technical Committee (SSTC), in conjunction with the 
Liberty Alliance (a consortium of industry groups including British Telecom, Intel, 
Novell, Sun, Oracle, and AOL) in 2002 developed the highly regarded SAML 
(Security Assertion Mark-up Language 2.0 specification)6. SAML is essentially an 
HTTP and XML based set of specifications which describe identity data exchange 
scenarios. In addition the Liberty Alliance has been responsible for a number of 
related specifications, privacy and best practices documentation. They also support an 
                                                 
4  http://www.crm-daily.com/perl/story/13038.html 
5 http://openid.net/foundation/ 
6 http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/11785/sstc-saml-exec-overview-2.0-draft-06.pdf 
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interoperability testing program to ensure that organizations which implement the 
SAML protocol do some in a consistent manner.  SAML is discussed in greater detail 
more in chapter 2.1.3.2 
 Information Cards: a more recent initiative by Microsoft, Novell, Oracle, Google, 
Deutsche Telekom, Intel and others to create a user-centric, standards based meta-
system which embraces the current set of technologies, and provides a consistent 
internet user agent, and operating system integrated interface for managing and 
supplying multiple identities, each of which is modeled as a set of ‘claims’ which the 
user presents, either self-asserted (e.g. ‘my nationality is South African’) or ‘managed’ 
(e.g. a claim managed by a third party. So for instance the Department of Home 
Affairs might issue a card, containing a claim to the effect that a certain user’s Id 
number is a given sequence of numbers. This claim is ‘managed’ by Home Affairs. 
The mechanism for this interaction is discussed in Chapter 2). 
At the same time as these advances in identity management have been occurring, an unrelated 
set of specifications were being developed by the W3C, specifically the geolocation API 
specification7, which at the time of writing has the status of an ‘informal  proposal’. 
Geolocation is a new technology which is understood to mean the identification of the actual 
geographic location of a connected user agent (and, by implication, its user). It is usually 
expressed as the set of latitude and longitude co-ordinates, collectively described as geo-data. 
A full set of geo-data may well include other ‘precision’ indicators, as well as data expressing 
altitude, and heading (i.e. direction of travel).  Despite being in its infancy, there is already a 
client implementation (‘Geode’) available for the popular Firefox browser8, offered by the 
Mozilla foundation. In addition numerous API’s and libraries have been published which 
offer similar functionality: essentially the ability to geo-locate the client user-agent using IP 
address lookups, or more advanced tools. 
This is novel functionality, and many devices and browsers will support the ability to geo-
locate oneself, and numerous potential applications will emerge to take advantage of this 
                                                 
7 http://dev.w3.org/geo/api/spec-source.html 
8 http://labs.mozilla.com/2008/10/introducing-geode/ 
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functionality. However it raises important concerns about privacy and consent. The geode 
implementation handles these by the use of an ‘information bar’ which prompts the user to 
‘share’ his geo-data with a requesting site. 
This is a workable solution, but  it is suggested that this personal data falls squarely within the 
concept of a ‘claim’ as understood in the information card metaphor, and that the sharing of it 
is very well handled by the sending of an information card. The consistency of user 
experience and the strong encryption used to protect card data are additional good arguments 
in favour of doing so.  
There are some issues with this proposal. Since geo-data is liable to change reasonably often 
(e.g. with a laptop / mobile device user), there needs to be a seamless, uncomplicated way to 
synchronize this data to a user’s card. Secondly the current claims schema is constrained to a 
set of claims which do not include latitude and longitude. Thirdly the current paradigm for 
cards is as a mechanism for authentication, whereas the proposal of this work is to extend that 
use case to allow for simple consensual data sharing. 
This hypothesis of this thesis is that this proposal will enable a set of useful implementations 
and these will be illustrated with reference to some extensions to an open source, cross-
platform information card implementation, the openinfocard project9. 
The paper is structured as three further chapters. The first (Chapter 2) outlines the key 
technology areas of interest. Firstly, digital identity, being the electronic representation of a 
user (being either a human being, or in a broader sense, an organization or a system entity, 
such as a device). Also discussed in this context are the identity domain problems of 
authentication (the requirement of reliably establishing who the user is), and authorization 
(establishing what electronic acts a user is permitted to perform). The paper examines 
traditional solutions to these problems, outlining the established weaknesses, and then moves 
on to critically discuss a number of currently emerging technologies.  There is particular focus 
on the notion of claims based security, embraced by the emerging Identity meta-system.  
Thereafter the concept of geo-location (introduced above) is further examined with a 
discussion of relevant technologies, and related privacy issues. 
                                                 
9 http://code.google.com/p/openinfocard 
A design to extend the claims identity model to include geo-data 
 11
Chapter 3 moves on to focus on the claims based security model and schemata, as they are 
currently implemented, and discusses the implications for extending them with further claims 
such as geo-data. Example schema changes are outlined, and an argument is made for using 
the claims model, and the identity meta-system tools for sharing geo-data online.  Also 
discussed are mechanisms for populating, and synchronizing these claim sets in the context of 
online / browser interactions. The chapter then outlines a series of hypothetical use cases 
which would be supported by such an implementation. Some attention is given to the 
question of vulnerabilities, and privacy. 
The final chapter brings the research together as set of findings, and focuses the requirements 
of the second chapter into recommendations. Areas for future research are outlined, and 
high-level conclusions of the research are documented. 
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3. Previous Work – an analysis of the landscape 
This chapter serves to describe the current situation in terms of the technology and related 
research in the field, and in this way outline the possibilities of the main proposal of this work. 
Although the field of identity is not new, most of the technology around the idea of the 
identity meta-system, claims based security, and information cards, is in its infancy. Initial 
implementations of these tools are in their first or beta versions: Microsoft’s beta version of 
its Security Token Server (Geneva) was released in November 2008.  10 Version 1 of the 
Microsoft Cardspace information card implementation was released in 2006. The 
IdentitySelector project which is an information card implementation for the Firefox browser 
was given an alpha release in December 200611. 
Accordingly this is not as yet a highly researched area (in academic terms at least). Much of 
the innovation and discussion of the area is emerging from various industry consortiums and 
work published in a less formal manner, for example online journals and blogs. 
In this section the intention is to discuss some of the concepts with reference to these 
publications and online resources, and to cover the emergence of the requirements for a 
ubiquitous identity system, and address some of the standards and technologies which are 
gaining traction. This process will implicitly generate a case for the proposal of this work to 
extend the current claims subset to incorporate geo-data. 
3.1. Digital Identity 
2.1.1 The Problem 
The internet (and digital environments generally) are context poor environments: human 
system actors are typically not in the presence of the systems or other human actors with 
whom they interact. Credentials are easily spoofed, or impersonated. It is difficult without 
resorting to non-standard technologies (bio-metrics, digital certificates) to unequivocally 
identity these users (and even these technologies are subject to exploits of various kinds).  
                                                 
10 http://blogs.msdn.com/card/archive/2008/11/04/geneva-server-beta.aspx  
11 http://www.codeplex.com/IdentitySelector/Release/ProjectReleases.aspx?ReleaseId=18845 
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The converse of this is that it is relatively easy for a software system (such as a website) to 
impersonate another one. This is the basis for the phenomenon known as phishing, where 
spoof sites are establishment to which users are lured, in an effort to steal user credentials 
which are thereafter used to access protected, high value resources.  The risk is theoretically 
mitigated by various security mechanisms built into modern browsers (SSL support, phishing 
detection), but statistics indicate that the threat is simply growing The service hosted at 
http://www.phishtank.com which validates suspected phishing sites reported 11,247 valid 
phish reports in December 200712 and 19, 332 in December 2008 13 representing an increase 
of 71 percent.. 
 The result of this is a limited ability to unequivocally identify the users, or the systems 
involved in digital interactions, and a consequent widespread problem of digital identity. 
As an example, in the context of online banking, a credit card transaction is referred to as a 
‘cardholder not present’ / CNP transaction14. These are easily repudiated by credit card 
holders because of the fact that the merchant is typically unable to supply any evidence 
(beyond the presentation of a primary account number (PAN), which is not conclusive) that 
the cardholder was in fact the user who initiated a transaction.  The merchant does not see the 
card, nor is it able to validate a signature against that contained on the back of the card. One 
might, with some justification argue that this evidence is of limited value too, but the fact is 
that user not present interactions contain little of the context which real world ones do. 
2.1.2 Traditional Solutions 
        2.1.2.1 Passwords 
The standard solution to internet based resource authentication and authorization control is a 
system based on username and password. This is a so-called ‘shared secret’ security 
implementation. A number of factors conspire to make this a poor solution for authenticating 
users15. 
                                                 
12 “Stats > December 2007”, http://www.phishtank.com/stats/2007/12/ 
13 “Stats > December 2007”, http://www.phishtank.com/stats/2008/12/ 
14 http://www.lloydstsbcardnet.com/merchant_account/card_not_present.asp 
15 And the password is…fundamentally insecure, Randall Stross, International Herald Tribune 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/08/11/technology/digi11.php 
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First is the emergence of phishing, and snooping software (keystroke loggers, packet sniffing 
on insecure data transports e.g.  HTTP) has meant that these credentials are often readily 
compromised.  
 
 Second is so-called ‘password fatigue’ which describes the phenomenon where users, weary 
of attempting to maintain unique passwords for multiple online resources simply resort to 
using one. This fact combined with the fact that web sites and services typically require an 
email address as the username (because it is guaranteed to be unique) , mean that when this 
combination is compromised, such a user may have his / her digital identity stolen in multiple 
contexts. The exercise of compromising these credentials is often made easier because of the 
fact that many users rely on naive, predictable passwords (‘password’, ‘11111’ etc.) 
 
Thirdly, inadequate data storage and management processes and security mean that this data is 
often compromised on the provider side, exposing thousands to identify theft. 
 
Some systems rely on multiple shared secrets, and implement policies that force these secrets 
to be ‘strong’, in other words hard to predict. These systems are more robust but by no means 
totally immune to the issues outlines above. 
 
           2.1.2.2 Multi-factor authentication 
As a result of the problems of shared secrets identity implementations, multi-factor 
authentication technologies emerged. The phrase multi-factor means a combination of the 
following:  
1. Personal factors: (“ Something you know”), e.g. a shared secret, such as a password 
2. Technical factors: (“Something you have”) e.g. a phone number, PDA, smart card, or 
digital certificate. 
3. Human factors: (“Something you are”) a measurable human characteristic typically 
bio-metric data such as voice, fingerprint or DNA attributes. 
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Sites and services offering multi-factor authentication require more than one factor to 
authenticate a user, or authorize a transaction. So for example a user will be required to 
provide a password, and a digital certificate, or a one-time password (OTP) sent to him / her 
in an out-of-band channel e.g. on a registered mobile phone number, or perhaps use a 
fingerprint reader allowing the user to submit digital bio-metric data. 
Multi factor authentication raises the bar, and makes fraudulent impersonation considerably 
more difficult. As a result the Federal Financial Institutions Examinations Council, an 
American banking regulation body, issued guidance in October 2005 to the effect that all 
banks in its jurisdiction should implement multi-factor authentication by December 2006.16 
While these represent a leap forward, and offer a number of flexible options for a variety of 
requirements, they are not immune to some of the issues mentioned earlier, and  have a few 
unique problems of their own too17. 
Firstly, multi-factor techniques are vulnerable to so called man-in-the-middle attacks. A typical 
scenario might work like this: a user is enticed to surf to a phishing site where he enters his 
username and password, the phishing site uses this data to automate a logon to the real site, 
this ‘initial’ logon causes the real site to issue a one-time password to the user’s mobile phone 
(or requires the user to use an issued device to generate one). The attacker then enters this 
password into the phishing site, which simply passes it on, authenticating to the site.  Out of 
channel solutions do not solve this problem. This is illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
                                                 
16 http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication_guidance.pdf 
17 Two-factor authentication: Too little, Too late: http://www.schneier.com/essay-083.html  
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Figure 1: Swim lane diagram of man in the middle attack with multi-factor authentication  
Another potential issue attaches to biometric-data, which is easily digitally stored, and cannot 
be changed after being compromised (like a password could).  
The most robust of these technologies impose a significant cost overhead on the process of 
authenticating users. This may be as a result of additional hardware or software requirements 
to provide an additional technical ‘factor’. This cost will logically, ultimately be borne by the 
users themselves. Additionally they introduce complexity to the process. Nonetheless, it can 
be argued that these are acceptable costs in light of the value of the resources being protected 
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        2.1.2.3 The status quo 
Clearly, digital identity has many challenges to face. Traditional solutions are often insecure, 
ineffective, proprietary, expensive and complicated from a user’s point of view. In the view of 
some even the ‘best’ current solutions will simply be expensive failures18. 
2.1.3 Emerging Solutions 
In the light of these obstacles a new set of protocols have emerged.  They have similar design 
goals. They are defined by open specifications19 to enable interoperability20, and have limited 
technology requirements It is important to note that these are protocols; a set of rules 
defining communication between endpoints to convey identity information. Protocols are by 
definition open. They are not proprietary technologies which require to be licensed, or which 
expose only a limited API for public consumption.  These are simply useful skeletons for 
constructing a set of tools to support digital identity. 
2.1.3.1 OpenID 
OpenID is a set of specifications which support establishing identity with reference to 
‘ownership’ of a resource identifier, generally a universal resource identifier (URI), but also an 
extensible resource identifier (XRI).  An XRI is a “URI-compatible scheme, and resolution 
protocol”21  unique identifier issued and resolved by an ‘i-broker’, in a similar fashion to 
domain names. An XRI would resolve to something like: “= matthew.evans” (an i-name) or 
=! 1000.1ab2! 93d2! 8c73 (an i-number, conceptually similar to a machine and router friendly 
DNS address22). These identifiers have conventions for personal, corporate and network 
identifiers making them extensible to the requirements of the environment. Additionally they 
are location transparent, in that they are not tied to a specific location (like a postal address), 
device (like a phone) or service (like an email address). They are therefore resilient to changes 
to this underlying data, and they satisfy many of the privacy requirements of a digital identity.  
                                                 
18 Two-factor authentication: Too little, Too late, http://www.schneier.com/essay-083.html 
19 The OpenId Specifications, 2007. OpenID Foundation. http://openid.net/developers/specs/ 
20 The Identity Selector Interoperability Profile V 1. 5 
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/Identity_Selector_Interoperability_Profile_V1.5.pdf 
21 http://www.xdi.org/xri-and-xdi-explained.html 
22 Marc Mercuri, Beginning Information Cards and Cardspace, 2008,New York,  Apress, 57 
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An i-broker hosts a personal contact page, which mediates authentication requests, from 
parties requesting identity confirmation. The identity standard for XRI is maintained by the 
Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) 23 
The OpenID specification defines three principal actors: a Relying Party (RP), the User-
Agent, and the OpenID Provider (OP)24. The Relying Party is a “Web application that wants 
proof that the end user controls an Identifier”, the User-Agent is the “end user's Web 
browser which implements HTTP/1.1”, and the OP is the “An OpenID Authentication 
server on which a Relying Party relies for an assertion that the end user controls an 
Identifier”.  
The protocol defines the format of authentication requests from a relying party, supported 
encryption standards, security standards and requirements, the format of number-used-once 
(‘nonce’) identifiers and the supported scenarios. These scenarios include immediate or 
deferred authentication, deferred or non-immediate authentication is defined as authentication 
which requires the end-user to interact with the OpenID provider (typically by authenticating 
to it).  All data transfer takes place using standard HTTP redirects and GET /POST actions. 
A typical scenario follows. A user navigates to a website via a browser. When attempting to 
access a protected resource, the site responds with an authentication challenge, indicating that 
is recognizes certain OpenID providers (for example, the popular 
http://www.myOpenID.com).  
2.1.3.1.1 Discovery 
The user enters his claimed identifier for that provider, and the relying party performs HTML 
discovery on that identifier. This requires it to ascertain the provider’s endpoint URL (i.e. the 
address at which it will accept HTTP post parameters). This information is contained in an 
HTML link tag within the head element of the HTML document contained at the claimed 
identifier. So, the document accessible via HTTP at http://mattevans.myOpenID.com/ 
contains the following mark-up within the head element:  
                                                 
23 http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=xri 
24 OpenID Authentication 2.0 – Final, Terminology,  http://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0.html#terminology 
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<link rel="OpenID2.provider" href="http://www.myOpenID.com/server" />, which is the providers 
endpoint URL. 
2.1.3.1.2 Association 
Using this endpoint, the relying party will establish an association with the server, which 
implies agreeing a signature algorithm (either 160 or 256 bit key length secure hashing 
algorithm (SHA), with 256 bit preferred),  and the session type, which “defines the method 
used to encrypt the association's message authentication code in transit.”. Here either 160 / 
256 bit Diffie-Hellman SHA encryption is supported.  Once the association is established, the 
authentication request is actioned. 
2.1.3.1.3 Authentication 
Typically the user is then redirected to the OpenID provider to complete the authentication. 
The specification is not prescriptive as to how authentication should occur, but generally this 
occurs via a username / password login process. However it occurs, once the OpenID 
provider is satisfied that the end-user is the owner of the URI (the ‘claimed identifier’25) it 
issues a positive assertion in the defined format, and POSTS a set of parameters back to the 
URL defined by the relying party (the ‘return_to’ parameter of the request) which include the 
encoded signature, a number-used-once parameter (to prevent replaying of the assertion at the 
relying party). 
At this point the interaction is complete and the user is redirected to the resource. Numerous 
variations on this use case are possible, but this is a typical scenario. 
The figure below illustrates the process outlined above. 
                                                 
25 OpenId Authentication 2.0 – Final, Request Parameters http://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-
2_0.html#anchor27 
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Figure 2: OpenID authentication process 
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2.1.3.1.4 Problems addressed by this protocol 
The OpenID model was conceived to overcome the problem of multiple identities. Simply 
put, you have one OpenID, and you re-use it everywhere you require to authenticate yourself 
(wherever it is supported). Additionally you are not required to maintain multiple sets of data 
at all of the services you use. Your identity is maintained (and secured) by one provider.  You 
are not required to remember usernames and password for a plethora of locations.  There are 
now multiple OpenID providers including Google and Microsoft26. 
2.1.3.1.5 Strengths 
The model is particularly potent in that it leverages ubiquitous protocols and standards (DNS, 
HTTP/S, and HTML) which are well established and easily understood. It is relatively simple 
to set up an OpenID server (although to become a trusted open identity provider is another 
matter).   It is decentralized and enjoys all the benefits of that (network resilience, reliable 
availability). Additionally the single identity concept is very compelling to users suffering from 
password fatigue. 
2.1.3.1.6 Weaknesses 
The same factors which make OpenID so widespread (as least in implementation terms) 
operate against it. There are hundreds, if not thousands of Open Id providers27.  Because the 
specification admits of multiple different scenarios, and defines support for a variety of 
different technologies and encryption standards, it is unlikely that any the implementations 
across providers will be uniform. Supporting multiple implementations is difficult and 
expensive for relying parties28, and in the end probably not viable. Additionally, how should a 
relying party decide which providers to trust authentication assertions from? 
The single identity concept is alluring, yet probably flawed. It is in fact preferable to allow 
multiple identities. One’s identity, understood as the digital data which define me uniquely, as 
far the South African Revenue Service is concerned is not an appropriate set of identity data 
                                                 
26 Microsoft announces support for OpenId: http://www.identityblog.com/?p=1026 
27 http://openiddirectory.com/openid-providers-c-1.html 
28 OpenID Gets Explained, Maligned, and Dropped http://ostatic.com/blog/openid-gets-explained-maligned-and-dropped 
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to reveal to, for example, an online shopping site. Multiple identities are the reality of the 
offline world, and so the preferred online solution should support this. 
More significantly, because of its reliance on username / password, OpenID is still vulnerable 
to phishing29. The demonstration site at http://idtheft.fun.de/, illustrates how easy it is to 
screen-grab HTML from any OpenID provider selected and generate a phishing site on-the-
fly, which then harvests one’s OpenID credentials. The seriousness of this is exacerbated 
when considering the implications of a single identity. Once compromised, this identity could 
be impersonated across multiple different relying parties. This risk is further elevated by virtue 
of the fact that OpenID providers keep a record of activity by the end user. Here’s an 
example from my OpenID profile (with relying party domains removed) 
 
Figure 3: OpenID history 
This fact would allow a successful phisher to access a user’s profile, and see a list of sites 
which the user had visited, thereby allowing him access all of them, with the freshly phished 
OpenID. It also represents a privacy issue. Why should an identity provider need to know 
which sites a user has accessed? This is referred to as ‘linkability’. 
                                                 
29 Gone Phishing, Mike Jones, 2008 http://self-issued.info/?p=73 
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Clearly there are security and privacy issues with OpenID, and despite a lot of mainstream 
support, it has come under heavy attack for these30. Some propose that it is suitable for low 
value identity use cases31. Proposals to mitigate some of these risks have emerged, and recently 
been implemented. These will be discussed later in this chapter. 
2.1.3.2 Security Assertion Mark-up Language 
SAML, developed under the auspices of the Organization for the Advancement of Structured 
Information Standards (OASIS) “defines a common XML framework for exchanging security 
assertions between entities”32  
Conceptually similar to OpenID in that it operates in a framework where an Identity Provider 
(IdP) makes various identity assertions to a service provider (SP), these claims are released on 
authentication typically via a user redirect (as with OpenID), although this local authentication 
mechanism is again left to the provider.  
The framework itself is more rigorous, and relies on XML for data exchange.. It has gained a 
lot of traction in the enterprise with IBM, Sun, Oracle, and VeriSign already providing 
products which support SAML33. These products are subjected to compatibility testing via the 
Liberty Alliance Project34, a consortium of industry members whose focus is the 
“establishment of open standards, best practices and guidelines for federated identity” 35 and 
identity based web services. 
2.1.3.2.1 Design Goals 
Version 2.0 of the standard was approved on February 1, 200536 and as reflected in the 
Technical Overview published prior thereto, the drivers were fourfold37. 
                                                 
30 OpenID: Phishing Heaven, http://www.links.org/?p=187 
31 Why OpenID leads to Cardspace http://www.identityblog.com/?p=923  
32 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 Technical Overview, Hughes and Maler, 2004, 4 
33 Debunking SAML myths and misunderstandings  http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/xml/library/x-samlmyth.html 
34 https://www.projectliberty.org/liberty/about 
35 Marc Mercuri, Beginning Information Cards and Cardspace, 2008,New York,  Apress, 55 
36 http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=xacml#XACML20 
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1. To address the limitations of browser cookies. A cookie is an opaque piece of data 
either stored in a browser’s internal memory (a session cookie), or persisted to disk (a 
permanent cookie). Encrypted data stored in this cookie is often used to store 
authentication state information. On each protected resource request this state is 
checked to ensure a user is logged in and entitled to access the resource. This is often 
used to allow so-called Single-Sign-on (SSO), when a user is accessing a number of 
different resources.  However cookies are only accessible via the browser by the 
application at the domain name which issued them, so their ability to work cross 
organizational boundaries was limited. 
2. Generally SSO technologies are proprietary, which is limiting. 
3. Web services security mechanisms were limited at the time, restricted to the Web 
Service Extensions (WSE) standards, which were not baked into SOAP. 
4. Federation. Federation is the provisioning of trust relationships across organizational 
boundaries. 
2.1.3.2.2 Data Format 
As mentioned SAML transfers data in the structured XML (Extensible Markup Language) 
format. This allows for semi-structured, hierarchical data which is defined by published 
schemas.  XML is well supported and there is wide availability of tools to parse and validate it. 
This makes for a robust, richly expressive data format which can store data defined in 
multiple schemas simply by referencing their relevant namespaces.  
2.1.3.2.3 Front Channel SAML 
The fact that XML is the data format of choice does not imply that in all instances of SAML 
authentication a web service (SOAP) interface is invoked. SAML 2.0 explicitly added support 
for HTTP redirect / POST binding. This is described as a front channel exchange. All 
interactions are mediated by the end users browser which displays XHTML forms, which 
                                                                                                                                                
37 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 Technical Overview, Hughes and Maler, 2004, 5 
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include the defined request and response XML tokens in hidden form fields. Transport level 
security is mandated in the form of SSL 3.0 
  This flow is defined as the Web Browser SSO Profile38, and a typical interaction would 
proceed as follows: 
A user requests a protected resource via a browser. The relying party supports SAML 2.0. The 
relying party detects that the user is not checked in, and serves a XHMTL39 form to the user. 
This form contains a hidden form field with the identifier ‘SAMLRequest’. This value of this 
field is the encoded XML for a SAML request.  Here is very basic example of such a request. 
<SAMLRequest RequestID=”urn:SAMLID:17862301” Version=”100”> 
  <AssertionID>urn:SAMLID:29100231XA</AssertionID> 
</SAMLRequest> 
 
This SAMLRequest is requesting an assertion with a defined identifier40.  An assertion is 
simply a statement issued by an identity provider about some aspect of the digital subject. It 
may be an attribute statement, expressed as name-value pair, or an authentication statement 
confirming that the subject authenticated at a specific time, or a combination.  The assertion 
returned is defined by the request assertion identifier.  The structure of requests, responses 
and assertions are all defined in schema managed and hosted by OASIS.  
Instead of requesting a specific assertion id, the request might instead contain a query type. 
These correspond to the categories of assertion statements which are possible. So a request 
might explicitly contain an authentication request41. The request would contain an Assertion 
                                                 
38 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 Technical Overview, Hughes and Maler, 2004, 14 
39 XHTML stands for Extensible Hypertext Markup language; it is simply a dialect of HTML which complies with XML rules 
regarding well-formed mark-up. This makes its format predictable and susceptible to validation by schema, and therefore 
parsing. This is important since  form elements contain the relevant SAML XML which need to be parsed out during the 
exchange. See “What is XHTML?”,  http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/#xhtml 
40 Draft SSTC protocol discussion, Mclaren and Mishra, http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security/docs/draft-sstc-
protocol-discussion-00.doc , 4 
41 Example SAML 2.0 request and response http://rnd.feide.no/content/example-saml-20-request-and-response 
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Consumer Service URL which defines the endpoint at which the SAML response is to be 
returned, and a destination attribute which can issue valid assertions in respect of the request. 
The user’s browser then POSTS the form data to the identity provider (in earlier SAML 
specifications this was referred to as an inter site transfer service (ITS)) defined by the 
destination, and if the user has no security context at the destination, he / she authenticates 
(by normal password authentication, but conceivably in another manner e.g. by certificate). 
This authentication creates a security context at the identity provider. 
The user is then sent another XHTML form with a SAMLResponse hidden form field. This 
has a destination attribute which corresponds to the consumer service URL contained in the 
original request.  The browser posts this form data to the Assertion Consumer Service URL 
defined in the request and the user is thereafter provisioned a security context at the service 
provider. This would typically be persisted by a cookie.   
Finally the user is redirected to the protected resource. Subsequent requests to this service 
provider would detect that the user is authenticated. Should the user navigate to another 
service provider in the same realm (trust domain),  the browser would execute the same 
process, and detecting the security context on the server return a authenticated 
SAMLResponse to the new service provider, without the requirement for the user to 
authenticate again. Thus the Single sign-on use case is achieved. 
Note: this SAML specifications also defines a ‘redirect’ binding which relies on HTTP GET 
actions instead of HTTP POSTS (in this case the SAML request and response would be 
passed to the browser not in a hidden form field but in a query string SAMLRequest 
parameter) 
The process is illustrated in the following diagram.  
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Figure 4: SAML Sign-on with POST binding 
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2.1.3.2.4 Back Channel SAML 
Back channel exchanges, on the other hand rely on direct communication between the relying 
party and the Identity provider, using the published SOAP over HTTP Binding. This enables 
a relying party to issue an authorization request to the identity provider via the back channel 
(i.e. not via the user interface) and retrieve the soap response including a status code to 
authenticate a user 
2.1.3.2.5 Additional use cases 
The primary use case supported by SAML’s authentication request protocol is single sign-on, 
but its richness supports multiple other scenarios too. Authorization queries (a particular type 
of SAML request) defined in the assertion and request protocol support answering queries 
such as “Should action(s) Y on resource Z be allowed for subject S given evidence E?”  42. 
Additionally, other protocols support other use cases. A Single sign-out protocol, for instance, 
defines the exchanges required to nullify a security context at a given provider. 
2.1.3.2.6 Strengths 
Based on XML, SAML is highly expressive of multiple different scenarios. XML allows the 
use of multiple schemas in combination, allowing the continuous extension of these schemas 
and the establishment of a rich inheritance hierarchy. The schema language (XSD) supports 
the concept of extension explicitly which allows the model to expand, and to build upon 
previous versions. As an example the schema definition of the ‘AuthnRequestType’ has at is 
base attribute the ‘RequestAbstractType’. This brings a level of object orientation to the 
model, allows for polymorphic request handling, and defines a base for future query types.  
SAML is less permissive about implementations.  There is a rich set of best practices, and as 
should be clear the protocols are considerably more rigorous as to what is permissible and 
how various data values, binding combinations are to be interpreted. This makes 
                                                 
42 Draft SSTC protocol discussion, Mclaren and Mishra, http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/security/docs/draft-sstc-
protocol-discussion-00.doc , 9 
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implementation and integration across organization boundaries more predictable. This, it is 
suggested, is what has lead to what appears to be increased adoption across the enterprise43 
2.1.3.2.7 Weaknesses 
The SAML specification is silent on how an end-user should authenticate to an identity 
provider, it defines the structure of the various protocols (authentication, logout) various 
bindings (SOAP, HTTP), and the appropriate combinations thereof for the various use case 
profiles. 
The result of this is that a SAML implementation may support username / password as its 
authentication mechanism. In this case the predictable phishing vulnerability exists.  
Another issue is related to the SAML supported redirect, and artifact bindings (which support 
passing data handles allowing parties to an exchange to interact and exchange data 
asynchronously to an authentication request). These bindings, it has been argued, allow an 
identity provider to establish information about the user (the service provider used, for 
instance) which it has no business knowing.  This is a privacy concern.44  
2.1.3.3 The Identity Meta-system 
Arguably the most ambitious identity initiative is the so-called digital identity meta-system 
which is the subject of ongoing work by various industry leaders who collectively have 
released many specifications and schemas. This technology is the subject of open patent 
promises by the various involved parties including Microsoft45, and IBM46. The primary idea 
of the meta-system is to enable disparate systems on different platforms to speak the same 
digital identity protocols, irrespective of their underlying authentication architecture. This is a 
                                                 
43 Google, NTT and the US GSA Deploy SAML 2.0 for Digital Identity Management 
http://projectliberty.org/liberty/news_events/press_releases/google_ntt_and_the_us_gsa_deploy_saml_2_0_for_digital_i
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tall order, and the authors of the document outlining its aspirations47  describe the ‘practical 
considerations’ and design goals of attempting this exercise: 
2.1.3.3.1 Goals  
1. Improved security and privacy. Clearly the system should lead to improved internet 
security and consumer privacy. 
2. The meta-system would need to be inclusive of existing technologies, rather than a 
substitute for them. In this context the authors explicitly mention digital certificates 
and SAML. This is the meaning of the word “meta-system” in this context; it is a 
system of systems.  
3. Inclusive of scenarios. To obtain broad acceptance the meta-system would need to 
support a broad range of sometimes conflicting requirements. 
4. The system would need to be incrementally deployable, and not require some kind of 
‘flag day’ upgrade. 
2.1.3.3.2 The Laws of Identity 
The meta-system additionally is subject to a set of formulated Identity Laws48 which have 
been widely debated and restated. At this point they are not unilaterally agreed upon, but most 
authors seem to agree that they (or a subset of them) are reasonably sound. 
As restated by the original author, the laws are as follows (quoted verbatim)49: 
1. People using computers should be in control of giving out information about 
themselves, just as they are in the physical world. 
                                                 
47 Design Rationale behind the Identity Metasystem Architecture, Kim Cameron and Mike Jones, Microsoft Research, January 
2006.  http://research.microsoft.com/~mbj/papers/Identity_Metasystem_Design_Rationale.pdf 
48 The Laws of Identity, Kim Cameron, http://www.identityblog.com/stories/2004/12/09/thelaws.html 
49 http://www.identityblog.com/?p=1007 
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2. The minimum information needed for the purpose at hand should be released, and 
only to those who need it. Details should be retained no longer than necessary. 
3. It should NOT be possible to automatically link up everything we do in all aspects of 
how we use the Internet. A single identifier that stitches everything up would have 
many unintended consequences. 
4. We need choice in terms of who provides our identity information in different 
contexts. 
5. The system must be built so we can understand how it works, make rational decisions 
and protect ourselves. 
6. Devices through which we employ identity should offer people the same kinds of 
identity controls - just as car makers offer similar controls so we can all drive safely. 
Admirable as these may be, some have expressed criticism of the real life viability of some of 
them50. A more concise set has been described by Ben Laurie51, which requires that for an 
overarching meta-system to be useful, and protective of privacy it should support assertions 
that are verifiable, for instance, simply asserting that one is 18 years old, is not adequate proof 
to allow a user to order alcohol via the internet.  The assertions should be minimal, which 
means that disclosure should be limited to the necessary information. This corresponds to 
point 2 of the original set of requirements. To continue the proof of age example, a minimal 
assertion would simply be one which asserts that the user is in fact over 18, it should not 
require the user to disclose his / her actual age, or Id number, for instance. Finally the 
assertion should be unlinkable by relying parties, or identity providers to other assertions. This 
would defeat the minimal disclosure requirement. 
 
                                                 
50 Revisiting the Laws of Identity, Clayton Donley 
http://blogs.oracle.com/clayton/2008/08/revisiting_the_laws_of_identit.html 
51 http://www.links.org/?p=15 
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2.1.3.3.3 Roles 
The design rationale document defines three roles:  
1. Identity Providers: the entity which issue digital identities, in the same way that a bank 
issues a credit card 
2. Relying parties (analogous to the service provider concept defined in the SAML 
vocabulary). The ubiquitous example is a web site, or service. 
3. Digital Subjects: the entities to whom identities are issued, such as individuals or 
organizations. 
2.1.3.3.4 Claims 
In the meta-system model an identity is comprised of a set of claims (a claim-set) about 
various identity related properties of the subject. These properties are defined in a schema52 
and range from given name and surname to mobile phone number and gender. The schema is 
extensible to new claim types should these be identified. 
Claim sets are represented by the concept of an information card, which is analogous to the 
kind of card one might encounter in the real world, such as a credit card, or a library 
membership card. A specific card might contain claims regarding my name, surname and 
country. 
2.1.3.3.5 Information Cards 
Cards may be of two types, self-issued or ‘managed’. A self issued card is one where the 
claims are simply asserted by the presenter. This might seem strange, but conceptually it is no 
different from what happens when a user registers on a web site. The user makes a set of 
assertions about his / her identity, and the website simply chooses to believe them. This is 
fine for low value resource access, but high value resources would require a card to be issued 
by a card authority, for example, a bank, or a government organization, and such a card is 
referred to as a managed card. The ‘authority’ is referred to as an Identity Provider (IdP). 
                                                 
52 Standard claim types defined by the information card model:  
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims.xsd 
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Authentication of the provider is effected by digital signing as outlined in the XML-Signature 
Syntax and processing specification53. Another way of looking at this is to say that self-
asserted (or personal cards) are simply asserted by a local token server (STS), while managed 
cards use the remote STS defined in the card. 
The identity selector interoperability profile54 defines how cards should operate, be issued, 
validated and stored.  Essentially they are simply digital data, encrypted and stored in a card 
store on a user’s machine. The storage mechanism is secure against the loss of the device on 
which the cards are stored, or the removal of the card store from the device55, by encrypting 
them with the user’s key (a hash value created by the user’s credentials) and a machine key. 
Optionally a user may elect to pin protect a card.  
A user would typically create multiple cards and re-use them across sites and services for 
which they were appropriate. 
 
2.1.3.3.6 Identity Selectors 
The creation and management of cards is performed using the identity selector software 
installed on his / her device. Microsoft’s identity selector implementation has been dubbed 
Cardspace, It runs on Windows XP, Vista and Windows 7 operating systems, and is 
compatible with the Internet Explorer Browser. There are, however, cross platform, and 
browser implementations for various popular Linux distributions, and Apple Mac operating 
systems which support the popular Firefox and Safari browsers. A number of them are 
supplied by the Digital Me project run by Novell which, is functionally equivalent to the 
Cardspace implementation56. There are also a number of other open source implementations, 
for example, the openinfocard project targeted at Mozilla / Firefox57.  The source code for 
                                                 
53 http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmldsig-core-20020212/Overview.html 
54 The Identity Selector Interoperability Profile V 1. 5 
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/Identity_Selector_Interoperability_Profile_V1.5.pdf 
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this project is used for the prototype implementation which forms the proposal of this 
submission. 
 
2.1.3.3.7 Browser Integration 
Identity selectors are invoked when a user clicks an information card login icon. These icons 
overlay an HTML object tag with a type attribute of “application/x-informationcard”. 
Clicking on it invokes the installed identity selector (either via ActiveX58, or the plug-in 
architecture of the browser). The user is then confronted with a dialog which looks like this: 
 
Figure 5: Firefox OpenInfoCard Identity Selector 
                                                 
58 Marc Mercuri, Beginning Information Cards and Cardspace, 2008,New York,  Apress, 72 
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This figure shows the identity selector interface displayed when clicking the information card 
icon at www.identityblog.com. Existing cards are displayed and may be selected, edited, 
deleted or submitted.   
The identity selector maintains a history of sites which it has supplied claims to, and, if 
appropriate, advises the user that this is the first visit to the site. There is also a link to the 
privacy policy hosted by the site. The Cardspace implementation goes further and warns the 
user explicitly about any issues with the site’s SSL certificate, or privacy policy. 
The user has the option to add a new card, which allows them to add a self asserted card and 
define the claims which it exposes, or to import a managed card (as defined earlier). 
Additionally the selector allows a user to create an OpenID backed card, by defining the 
relevant OpenID URI. This is an example of the integration of an existing technology into the 
meta-system. 
2.1.3.3.8 The standard use case 
Once a card has been selected and created, it is submitted to the relying party. This triggers a 
series of SOAP communications, during which a token is generated by a security token 
service and sent to the relying party. The security token service is either part of the identity 
selector implementation, in the case of a self asserted card, or alternatively, hosted at a 
metadata exchange endpoint, in the case of a managed card. Additionally a public / private 
key pair is generated. This is sent along with the card, and used to validate subsequent 
communications. 
The relying party must be capable of accepting and parsing these communications. Existing 
open source implementations for this requirement exist for most major web server stacks, 
including Java59, LAMP60 and .Net.   
Once the token is received it is parsed out, SSL signatures are checked, and the claims are 
imported. A unique identifier (the so called private personal identifier) is also passed in as a 
                                                 
59 https://xmldap.org/relyingparty/ 
60 http://www.pamelaproject.com 
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claim. This in combination, with the private key sent along, is used to generate a unique, non-
predicable identifier which allows the site to reliably re-identity repeat users61. 
Once the relying party has parsed the claims, inspected them, satisfied itself as to the validity 
of the attached cryptographic keys and signatures and (in the case of a managed card) the 
identity provider, it will validate the user’s authentication request. This is illustrated below: 
                                                 
61 Me and my PPID: Can I rely on it?, Garrett Serack, http://www.fearthecowboy.com/2007/01/me‐and‐my‐ppid‐can‐i‐rely‐on‐
it.html 
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Figure 6: Information card authentication  
What should be noteworthy is the fact that the user never enters a username or password; he 
or she simply selects an appropriate identity (card) and submits it. If a user was lured to 
submit the card to a phishing site, the token submitted would contain no password that could 
be stolen. To authenticate to a security token service for a managed card, three authentication 
measures are supported. X.509 certificates, Kerberos, and username / password. The 
username / password option may seem to open up a phishing attack vector, but it should be 
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remembered that the data is entered into the identity selector interface. There is no third party 
interface with which the user interacts at this point. This minimizes the phishing attack vector. 
Token replay is also mitigated by a set of factors, discussed later.  
2.1.3.3.9 Relying party Policy  
Secondly it is also noteworthy that the identity selector (via a security token service) might 
return any number of tokens. It might be a SAML token, or an OpenID one.  This is defined 
by the policy of the relying party. A policy is expressed as part of the syntax associated with 
the information card object tag in the relying party’s HTML. See below: 
<OBJECT type='application/x-informationCard' name='xmlToken'> 
<br/> 
   <PARAM Name="tokenType" 
Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion"> 
<br/> 







   <PARAM Name='optionalClaims' 
value='http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/webpage'> 
<br/> 






Inspecting this mark-up illustrates the site’s identity policy. The site requires a SAML token 
which supports four claims (private personal identifier, given name, surname, email address).  
Optionally it requests a web page address. Finally it includes a URL where its privacy policy is 
hosted.  
2.1.3.3.10 Strengths 
The identity meta-system has several compelling arguments, the absence of passwords, the 
consistent modal user interface, the correlation of the card metaphor with real life scenarios, 
and the use of strong cryptography.  The fact that it leverages existing technologies (X. 509 
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certificates, Kerberos, SAML, OpenID all have a role to play in appropriate scenarios), means 
that existing security implementations can be adapted to use it as enterprise acceptance grows.  
Additionally the application of the principle of “Minimal Disclosure” is highly protective of 
privacy. An identity provider never need have knowledge of the relying party. It simply 
responds to a request from the identity selector to issue a token response in respect of certain 
claims. There is no linkability problem. 
The metasystem implicitly recognises that users have multiple identities, and identity 
requirements. Thus a user may have an OpenId identity which s/he uses for blogging, and 
commenting on websites. The user may have another one for submitting a tax return online. 
In each case the requirements differ, and the data the user wishes to transmit would not be 
the same. Thus the user would have a card for each identity. This card would be re-used 
across appropriates services, saving the time and effort currently required for multiple 
registration processes. 
It is suggested that these factors and the willingness of the industry contributors to the 
technology to release all the required specifications in an open format, mean that there is great 
promise for the identity meta-system.  
2.1.3.3.11 Weaknesses 
A recent study at the University of Ruhr62, illustrated a token replay attack vector. This relied 
for its effectiveness on three things, the wilful installation and trust acceptance by the user of a 
fake root certificate, and the ‘poisoning’ of the users DNS. A number of individuals have 
pointed out the difficulty of the first requirement63, amongst other things. Nonetheless, it is 
clear that there will be continued malicious investigations of this angle. 
Additionally there is some research which is critical of the fact that claims data is revealed to 
the relying party 64.The authors’ argument is that the assertion of claims data can be 
                                                 
62 On the Insecurity of Microsoft's Identity Metasystem CardSpace, http://demo.nds.rub.de/cardspace/ 
63 http://idunno.org/archive/2008/05/29/quoton-the-insecurity-of-microsofts-identity-metasystem-cardspacequot.aspx 
64 Improving the Security of CardSpace, Waleed A. Alrodhan and Chris J.Mitchell, EURASIP Journal on Information Security 
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mathematically asserted and proved via an agreed protocol) and as such ‘accepted’ by the 
relying party without knowing the value. For instance one might assert citizenship of the 
European Union without having to reveal to the relying party the member state in which one 
lives. This is an interesting possibility, but it does not allow for those cases where the claims 
data itself is of importance to the relying party. 
This brings to a conclusion the section on the current state of internet identity protocols and 
initiatives. The focus has been on OpenId, SAML, and the Internet identity meta-system, 
which embraces both of these (being described “token-agnostic”). The proposal of this work 
is to extend the claims model which underpins the meta-system to include geo-data, as 
defined and briefly elaborated upon in the introductory chapter. Accordingly the attention of 
this paper now turns to the technologies, and specifications which have begun to emerge in 
the area of geo-location. 
3.2. Geo-Location 
Geo Location stands for geographic location. It refers to the process of establishing the real 
world geographic location of people or objects. New technology advances have meant that 
many users are able to geo-locate themselves, and to submit this data relatively easily.  As a 
result there has suddenly emerged a category of ‘location-aware’ applications65.  They range 
from social network applications66, to e-commerce sites which are aware of your location and 
suggest appropriate products and services, to broadcasting services67. 
2.2.1 Enabling technologies 
2.2.1.1 GPS 
GPS stands for global positioning system. It is a radio-navigation technology enabled by a 
network of satellites maintained and developed by the US Air Force. Originally intended for 
military use, in the 1980’s it was made available for civilian use. GPS enabled devices have 
                                                                                                                                                
Volume 2009 
65 “Here come the geo-smart apps’, http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/yahoo_geolocation_api.php 
66 http://brightkite.com/ 
67 Social Radio Listening BBC http://www.radiopop.co.uk/ 
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recently become widely available. It is free and continuously available.68 It works by 
triangulating a set of signals from various satellites to define the user’s latitude, and longitude. 
2.2.1.2 IP address services 
Many services69 have emerged which allow services to resolve a user’s location by reference to 
the IP address passed in the headers of a HTTP request. These IP addresses are resolved by 
checking the IP address against a database of known IP addresses or address ranges. These 
services are typically able to resolve a user’s location to the metro (city) level.  
2.2.1.3 Hybrid Positioning Systems 
So called hybrid positioning systems are available as browser plug-ins70, or JavaScript API’s71 
which work by using the wireless capabilities of a device to identity local Wi-Fi signals, as well 
as scanning for GPS satellites and cellular towers. This data is integrated to resolve the user’s 
location to within a high degree of accuracy. Google provides such a service to users of its 
Gears API, Microsoft provides similar functionality through its Live Search Service72. Mozilla 
have recently introduced the Geode73 browser extension for Firefox, which wraps Skyhook’s 
LOKI functionality, and plans to support the W3C geolocation specification74. 
It is worth noting that both IP and HPS lookup based systems are only as good as the 
database which underlies them. In the South African context the geo-location data returned is 
often imprecise, but it is suggested that it is only a question of time until these databases 
become relatively exhaustive, and the lookups they provide highly reliable.  
                                                 
68 The Global Positioning System http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/index.html 
69 http://www.hostip.info/ 
70 http://www.skyhookwireless.com 
71 Geolocation API, http://code.google.com/apis/gears/api_geolocation.html 
72 http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd251082.aspx 
73 http://labs.mozilla.com/2008/10/introducing-geode/ 
74 Geolocation API Specification http://dev.w3.org/geo/api/spec-source.html 
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2.2.2 Privacy Concerns 
All these technologies are intended to provide relying party / service provider knowledge of 
user geo-data.  In most cases there is some recognition that there are privacy concerns, and 
that this is something that requires user consent: 
From the Google Geolocation API: “A site's permission to use location information is 
separate from the permission required by other Gears APIs. Permission is granted by the user 
in the same way as for other Gears APIs, through a dialog.”  
 
Figure 7: The Google Gears  geo-data consent dialog 
Mozilla have implemented their consent mechanism as follows: “With Geode when a web site 
requests your location a notification bar will ask how much information you want to give that 
site: your exact location, your neighborhood, your city, or nothing at all” 
3.3. Summary 
This concludes the section outlining the existing / previous work in the area which relates to 
the proposal of this submission. To summarize: the fragmented area of internet identity has 
been increasingly consolidated by a set of technologies which have  as their goal the secure, 
reliable exchange of identity information in a way that is protective of individual privacy. The 
A design to extend the claims identity model to include geo-data 
 43
most comprehensive and ambitious of these to date is the internet identity meta-system to 
which a broad spectrum of industry leaders have been contributing and which holds the 
promise of a highly secure, inter-operable digital identity framework. Additionally, and 
separately, a number of service providers and a specification have emerged supporting the 
concept of user geo-location. This technology is in its infancy but potentially offers much in 
the way of a customized, richer user experience on the internet. In the following chapter, the 
potential for these two technologies to be used in conjunction is examined, with reference to 
existing and hypothetical use cases. 
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4. Extending the claims model  
The previous section outlined the concept of digital identity as it currently exists and 
introduced the concept of claims based security as envisioned in the identity meta-system. It 
also described some recent advances in the field of geo-location. It is argued that this analysis 
highlights the relative merits of information cards as an identity standard. In this context this 
work now focuses on a proposed extension to the claims model and some associated value 
propositions. 
4.1. Claims currently recognized 
 The claims model is supported by a published schema75 which defines the claims which are 
currently recognized. The list is currently restricted to 15 identity properties: 
1. Given Name 
2. Surname 
3. Email address 
4. Street address 
5. locality 
6. State or Province 
7. Postal Code 
8. Country 
9. Home Phone  
10. Other phone 
11. Mobile Phone 
12. Date of birth 
13. Gender 
14. Private personal identifier 
15. Web page 
                                                 
75 http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims.xsd 
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Clearly, this represents a distillation of what the authors considered to be the standard 
identifiers required by relying parties. Broadly they can be divided into personal information 
claims (name, date of birth), location information claims (locality, street address) and contact 
information claims (phone number, mobile number). 
4.2. Proposed new claims 
It is the hypothesis of this work that the group of location information claims would be 
enhanced by extending it to encompass two additional ones: latitude and longitude. 
3.2.1 Rationale 
3.2.1.1 Privacy 
The identity claims defined in the schema reflect those that the authors felt should be released 
only with consent, via the identity selector mechanism to sites and services the identity of 
which the user had explicitly been made aware.  
It is clear that they considered location as a broad category of claim, however they omitted to 
include arguably the most granular location property: geo-location. It is unclear why this 
should be, perhaps it is a result of the fact that geo-location has only recently become easily 
accessible to internet users via the services and technologies discussed in the previous chapter. 
Nonetheless, it is suggested that this is unique, personal information which should not be 
shared with a relying party without consent. The potential for this information to be misused 
seems reasonably clear. 
The identity selector mechanism would make it trivial to create a geo-location information 
card, containing only the two claims, latitude and longitude, encapsulated in a complex 
schema type (“co-ordinates”), and to allow sites which require it to request that you ‘log-in’ 
with this information. (Ideally with this information only) 
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3.2.1.2 Existing support 
Extending the claims schema with the proposed values would make it simple to express a 
site’s policy requirement for latitude and longitude claims to be supplied to allow the user to 
access its geo-location services.  The mark-up would look like this (relevant claims italicised): 
<OBJECT type='application/x-informationCard' name='xmlToken'> 
<br/> 
   <PARAM Name="tokenType" 
Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion"> 
<br/> 





 <PARAM Name='privacyUrl' value='http://www.url.com’>  




The WS-Trust schema76 provides a well understood open language to express SOAP requests 
and responses for this data between service providers and identity providers 
3.2.1.3 Consistent User Experience 
The identity selector interface provides a predictable, consistent and secure way to share 
identity data with sites requesting it. This is explicitly defined as a requirement in the draft 
Geolocation API specification: 
“The API defined in this specification can be used to retrieve the geographic location of a 
hosting device. In almost all cases, this information also discloses the location of the user of 
the device, thereby potentially compromising the user's privacy. A conforming 
implementation of this specification MUST provide a mechanism that protects the user's 
privacy and this mechanism SHOULD ensure that no location information is made available 
without the user's informed consent.”77 
                                                 
76 http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/ws-trust-1.3.xsd 
77 http://dev.w3.org/geo/api/spec-source.html 
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It is submitted that information cards present a strong candidate for the proposed 
‘mechanism’ referred to in the specification. The alternative would be a varied set of consent 
mechanisms (as discussed here in the ‘Privacy’ heading of the subsequent Geo-location sub-
chapter), these proposed measures include dialogs, information bars and would probably 
include standard HTML form POST mechanisms too. The potential for user confusion and 
poor usability is high, and mitigate in favour of a standard interface for the task. 
The information card interface also defines a standardized manner for the user to access 
information about how the service intends to use and store this information (via the Privacy 
Policy link displayed by the identity selector) 
3.2.2 Compatibility with the Geolocation API 
This proposal is not incompatible with the Geolocation API, referred to above. 
That specification essentially defines a client side script API for interrogating geo-location. It 
does not prescribe how that information is obtained; in fact one of the stated requirements is 
that the Geolocation API must be agnostic to the underlying sources of location information. 
Essentially the two technologies would be complementary. Information cards would supply a 
robust, consistent mechanism to share geo-data with a requesting relying party, while the 
Geolocation API would define a standard way for the identity selector to obtain that geo-data. 
3.2.3 Populating the geo-location claims 
32.3.1 Self-issued cards 
In the case of self issued cards, the following two mechanisms are proposed. The first is 
manual data entry. The ‘new card’ dialog would expose two additional fields, latitude, and 
longitude.  
The following figure illustrates this, as prototyped against the openinfocard code-base: 
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Figure 8: New information card dialog including geo-data 
The second method of populating this claims data would be by invoking the geo-location API 
via JavaScript. This would return a JavaScript coordinates object, as defined in the 
Geolocation specification. 
  interface Coordinates { 
    readonly attribute double latitude; 
    readonly attribute double longitude; 
    readonly attribute double altitude; 
    readonly attribute double accuracy; 
    readonly attribute double altitudeAccuracy; 
    readonly attribute double heading; 
    readonly attribute double speed; 
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  }; 
 
Note: this requires that the user agent had some client side extension, or add-in installed 
which implemented the geolocation specification e.g. the geode browser extension mentioned 
earlier. The details of this are beyond the scope of the discussion. 
The identity selector would extract the latitude and longitude data from the co-ordinates data 
structure and dynamically populate the data entry fields. 
In either case, the form would validate for decimal values of latitude between -90 and +90, 
and values of longitude between -180 and +180.  
The cards so created would be stored encrypted in the local card store and relying party 
requests for tokens including these claim types would be handled by the local security token 
service, which would be responsible for generating a token them. 
 The issue of data currency (i.e. determining whether or not the geo-location data is 
reasonably current) is important. A user with a mobile device or notebook is likely to use this 
data in multiple locations, and so it might become stale at any point. A relying party might 
want to express its policy that this data be no older than a certain period of time. This could 
be accomplished by modifying the claims schema78 to define latitude and longitude as a 
complex type with the following definition: 
<xs:complexType name="coordinates"> 
  <xs:sequence> 
    <xs:element name="latitude" type="xs:decimal"/> 
   <xs:element name="longitude" type="xs:decimal"/> 
    <xs:element name="date" type="xs:dateTime"/> 
  </xs:sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
 
                                                 
78 http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims.xsd 
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This would store this claim with an associated date time value, and return it as such in the 
token response to the relying party, allowing it to assess the currency of the location data 
presented, and decline or accept it based on their policy.  
Alternatively, the information card schema includes a ‘TimeIssued’ element. This is a date 
time field79 which could be used in a similar manner. 
Another approach would be to prompt the user when selecting a card which contains these 
‘volatile’ claims to refresh the data (via either of the methods described above), before 
submitting it. 
3.2.3.2 Managed cards 
Where a high degree of reliability in respect of the geographic data is required, a number of 
other interesting possibilities arise, in the case of managed cards (i.e. cards issued by an 
identity provider). 
The identity selector interoperability profile specifies that an “Identity Provider can issue 
Information Cards to its users using any out-of-band mechanism that is mutually suitable.”  
Thus a bank might issue an information card via a USB memory device, or an email to a client 
user who would then import it into their identity selector software 
This card could then be submitted by the user to relying parties which respected cards issued 
by the bank as an identity provider.  
It is important to understand how this interaction works. An information card does not 
contain the claim data itself; it simply contains some information about what claims are 
supported (the SupportedClaimList element), what token services (STS)80 exist, and what 
tokens it can issue; finally it defines where the STS endpoint addresses are hosted. On 
submitting the card the identity selector requests an encrypted, signed token containing the 
claim data from the STS endpoint. 
                                                 
79 The Identity Selector Interoperability Profile V 1. 5,  Nanda & Jones, August 2008, 11 
80 Marc Mercuri, Beginning Information Cards and Cardspace, 2008,New York,  Apress, 249 
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It is also useful also to understand that card issuance is not a manual process, workflow 
automation processes can be implemented which issue cards on demand (obviously this 
requires some kind of authentication, possibly via another information card). 
With these facts in mind the following scenario is possible. 
1. A user requests access to a resource which requires the user’s accurate geo-location 
data. The user has a ‘hard token’ device, such as RSA’s SecurID product81 (or 
alternatively a mobile phone, with appropriate token software installed)) issued by a 
location identity provider, which additionally supports GPS geo-location. Such a 
product does not currently exist. 
2. The user issues an information card request via the device (which passes the geo-
location data) to the identity provider. The communication layer might be SMS, or 
MMS. 
3. The location identity provider authenticates the request, checks and stores the 
location data, and issues a card matching the request. 
4. An information card is returned to the device, which is connected to the primary 
device (i.e. the user’s laptop) via USB, or Bluetooth, and imported to the identity 
selector card store. 
5. The user submits this card; the identity selector invokes the location provider’s STS 
which issues a token, with a short “TimeExpires” element.  
6. The token is passed to the relying party which parses out the geo-data. 
This exchange is illustrated below: 
                                                 
81 http://www.rsa.com/products/securid/datasheets/9651_SID800_DS_0908-lowres.pdf 
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Figure 9: Location geo-data contained in managed cards 




4.3. Potential applications 
 
The use of a hardened token device (to ensure accuracy of geo-data) is a non-standard use 
case, requiring additional hardware, but has a number of potential enterprise applications. 
3.3.1 Preventing, or restricting remote access 
An example might be an application which needs to confirm a user’s location (probably in 
addition to other authentication factors) before granting him access to resources. For example 
an application might need to ensure that only users at a corporate headquarters environment 
(as defined by a certain latitude and longitude, within an acceptable degree of accuracy) are 
entitled to access a resource (to prevent remote access, for example) To do so they might 
require an identity information card which included geo-location data.  This use case would 
enable that scenario.  
Alternatively, remote access might be restricted to certain pre-defined locations. Banking 
institutions or other organizations offering online access to high-value resources might issue 
clients who require it, with a token device which enables them to submit secure geo-data. 
Access to the resource would then be permitted only if the client’s location fell within with a 
restricted set of acceptable locations. 
3.3.2 Location attendance auditing 
Another example usage might be location attendance auditing. To ensure that a employee 
actually attended a required set of locations, it would be possible to issue them with the token 
device and require them to authenticate their location appropriately, via an issued information 
card. This data could be logged and monitored. This might have applications for sales and 
customer service roles. It could also be useful in cases with employees in roles requiring them 
to attend remote locations (for example, in order to perform equipment inspection and 
servicing). 
A design to extend the claims identity model to include geo-data 
 54
This type of exchange would create a requirement for trusted location identity providers who 
would fill the role of issuing the devices, cards and tokens corresponding to these tokens.  
3.3.3 E-commerce 
E-commerce retail pricing may incorporate specific rules about which prices are available in 
which regions. An offer available to customers in a specific geography might require them to 
submit an acceptable geo-data card to establish their eligibility for this offer. 
3.3.4 Additional Concerns 
3.3.4.1 Roaming 
Although there are no current mobile operating system implementations of information card 
identity selectors, these are currently being prototyped82, and will likely emerge soon. When 
this occurs, these scenarios scenario will be entirely possible in a roaming / wireless context. 
The ‘card’ data would be stored on the SIM card, with PIN code protection. Alternatively, 
and until such time as these technologies cascade to phones and mobile devices, the phone 
could simply be used as storage device for the cards, and the user would access the remote 
services via a public (‘internet café’) computer, browser and identity selector. 
3.3.4.2 Vulnerabilities 
The attack mentioned in the ‘Weaknesses’ section of the information cards section in Chapter 
2 (i.e. the familiar token replay attack), is conceivable. As discussed there, however this attack 
relies for its effectiveness on two unlikely exploits (one of which requires significant user 
participation). That fact aside, a successful attack might allow a user aiming to ‘fake’ their geo-
data, to do so. The implications of this depend very much on the value of the claim to the 
relying party.  The vulnerability can be mitigated by allowing a short expiration time on the 
token (i.e. enforcing a very recent “Time Issued” stamp). 
The user of additional hardware (as posited in the discussion above) where a secure GPS 
token device is required could also pose an attack vector. In this case possession of the device, 
                                                 
82 http://research.microsoft.com/en-
us/um/people/mbj/misc/mobile%20information%20cards%20value%20proposition.doc. 
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and an appropriate identity selector enabled device could allow a user to masquerade as the 
user to whom the device was issued, and to submit false location data. 
Additionally revealing location data is an inherently risky activity. If a user were to be lured 
into revealing his / her location data to a relying party in error, this would constitute a serious 
breach of privacy. The scope for users to misjudge relying party trustworthiness in the 
information card scenario has been documented in an existing study83.  This threat may be 
somewhat mitigated by the use of high assurance / extended validation SSL certificates. 
3.3.4.3 Privacy concerns 
The first law of identity is user control and consent. This can be roughly expressed as “People 
using computers should be in control of giving out information”.  Geo-data is by its nature 
sensitive in much the same way as an address is. However an address may be less precise than 
current geo-data. As a result there are legitimate concerns around privacy and the sharing of 
geo-data. In all current implications of the geo-location API consent mechanisms are built. 
However, sharing geo-data via the mechanism of information cards has several distinct 
advantages. Data shared via a simple HTTP post is not encrypted; data sent via an 
information card, however, leverages SSL to encrypt the data transfer, and is thus secure 
against interception during that process. Secondly the identity selector interface checks the 
URL, SSL certificate and Privacy Policy of a requesting site. This information is presented to 
the user with appropriate warnings if necessary, to allow the user to make an informed 
decision about sharing the geo-data. It is submitted that these facts make this solution more 
protective of privacy than others. Also, it should be noted that should a user elect to  submit a 
card, the mere fact of doing so does not give a relying party ongoing access to a user’s geo-
data. It merely supplies a snap-shot of that information. 
                                                 
83 Improving the Security of CardSpace, Waleed A. Alrodhan and Chris J.Mitchell, Journal on Information Security 2009 




The hypothesis of this work centres on the viability of certain proposed additions to the 
existing published claims schema84 , in order to incorporate so called geo-data. By reference to 
the published schemas, integration mechanisms, and a series of hypothetical applications, it is 
argued that the following points were established. 
Through a limited set of extension to the claims identity model, it is possible to support the 
digital identity aspects of geo-location within the identity meta-system. 
The proposed changes are of minimal, non-breaking impact to the existing schema, and are 
easily incorporated into the identity selector user interface. 
The population of location data in an information card is possible via multiple mechanisms:  
manual data entry, by integration to browser geo-location programming interfaces, or by 
reference to third party geo-location providers. 
Finally, that the emergence of a coherent identity technology which incorporates the capability 
to reliably physically locate an enabled end-user, exposes a number of potentially useful 
enterprise and commercial applications which warrant further research. 
 
5.2. Recommendations 
In order to realize these use cases it would be necessary to implement certain changes to the 
current information card implementation.  
In specification terms, these changes are limited to the addition to that specification of a 
complex extensible schema definition type, ‘coordinates’. This element would simply 
encapsulate two decimal properties (latitude, and longitude), and optionally, a date/time 
element, defining the time at which the co-ordinates were valid. 
                                                 
84 http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims.xsd 
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The inclusion of this data in the schema would impact Id selector software, relying party 
implementations and token services, minimally, or not at all. The identity selector 
interoperability profile specifies as follows:” An identity provider. “SHOULD support these 
claim types at a minimum. Other Identity Providers MAY also support these claim types 
when appropriate. The URIs defined here MAY be used by a Relying Party to specify required 
claims in its policy.” As a result, no breaking changes to existing implementations would be 
entailed by its inclusion; however, future iterations of relevant software could include this 
functionality as a useful extension. 
It is worth noting that the Geo-Location API defines in its interface additional properties 
relevant to geo-location. These are altitude, heading (direction of travel) and speed; in addition 
it defines two accuracy properties.  Likewise, the ‘Coords’ class defined in the Google 
Geolocation API, supports an altitude property85. Taken together, these form a more accurate 
representation of a user’s location in time and space. It is suggested that as accurate and easily 
interrogated API’s for this data become accessible that the complex co-ordinates type be 
extended to encapsulate them as well, for purposes of this work, it has been assumed that 
useful applications can be demonstrated which rely only on latitude and longitude. 
5.3. Future Research 
Future research may centre on the usability of functional roaming implementations of the 
proposed extensions. At the time of writing there are no identity selector implementations for 
popular mobile operating systems (including Symbian, Windows Mobile or OS X for iPhone). 
These are understood to be in prototype for Windows Mobile, and the Higgins project’s Java 
based selector will likely be ported to Linux and Mac based mobile phones in the near future. 
The absence of existing software has had the result that some aspects of the hypothesis of this 
work (the effect of roaming and the requirement for geo-data refresh) cannot currently be 
prototyped. It is suggested that assuming consistent implementation of the Id selector 
interface, and the underlying specifications, these proposals are entirely viable; nonetheless it 
will be useful to assess the usability of specific aspects of the envisaged scenarios. 
                                                 
85 http://code.google.com/apis/gears/api_geolocation.html#coords 




This work has reviewed a number of new identity technologies which have emerged in 
response to the uniquely anonymous world of the internet. Current identity technologies have 
proved limited and vulnerable to a series of exploits which seem to only grow in scope. 
Of these new technologies, it is herein argued that one of the most promising is that of 
information cards, an operating system, and browser integrated interface to a set of identity 
‘claims’ (compositely forming ‘cards’) supported by a set of public specifications and current 
web service standards. Information cards are uniquely designed to leverage the set of existing 
technologies, like OpenId and SAML and X.509 certificates, require no passwords, and 
leverage strong cryptography to secure transferred information.  They are implemented from 
the ground up to comply with a set of ‘laws’ designed to robustly protect end user data 
privacy, reduce redundancy and improve application security. 
It has been hypothesized in this work that this promising technology would be meaningfully 
improved by supporting a set of limited extensions to the published specifications, which, if 
implemented, would position information cards as the primary interface for managing third 
party requests for an end user’s geo-data.   
How this data is provided is not fundamental to the concept, but it is argued that the W3C’s 
emerging geo-location API would provide a standardized manner for a browser to supply 
geo-location data. The hypothesized scenario envisages that a request for this information 
would require an invocation of an identity selector (using JavaScript or the HTML ‘object’ 
tag), the selection (and population) of an appropriate card (with some associated validation) 
and its subsequent submission to the relying party. 
The arguments in favour of doing so have been outlined as the consistent user experience 
offered by the identity selector interface, the robust privacy and consent mechanisms built 
into it, and the simplicity and standardization with which these could be integrated into a 
relying party’s expression of the information it requires, and the way in which this information 
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is transmitted and parsed. The current proposed mechanisms for user consent are varied - 
ranging from JavaScript alerts, to browser information bars. It is desirable that a standard 
cross browser / cross platform interface for sharing personal information is implemented, and 
it is argued that information cards are a good candidate for this.  
From a security perspective this novel concept of managing the consent requirement implicit 
in sharing geo-data using information cards is very attractive. The specifications leverage 
encryption technology to protect data in transfer and storage.  
Potential mechanisms for populating this data are discussed and, in the context of  managed 
(or provided) cards the scope for trusted third party geo-locating identity providers to supply 
this  data, and authenticate an end user’s location ‘claims’ are outlined. 
Finally a series of potential enterprise applications of this functionality are discussed. Primarily 
these focus on the ability to securely and accurately authenticate a users location via the 
mechanism of a submitted information card, using a third party Identity provider and, if the 
ability to ensure that the geo-data is correct is critical, a hardened (i.e. tamper proof) token 
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